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Abstract
This paper examines how different education systems affect GDP
by influencing the diversity of human capital. We construct an over-
lapping generation model in which agents are heterogeneous in income
and innate ability, and the final goods are produced with differentiated
intermediate goods. We analyze an economy in which an income dis-
tribution converges to a stationary distribution. It is shown that the
diversity of human capital induced by income inequality always low-
ers the GDP of the next period, while the diversity of human capital
induced by heterogeneous ability can increase GDP, if the produced in-
termediate goods are sufficiently substitutable and firms have a large
span of control. Hence, as public education equalizes education re-
sources across households, it mitigates the negative effect of income
inequality on GDP, while the effects of ability tracking crucially de-
pend on the production structure of the economy.
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1 Introduction
Economists typically consider that education can improve the human capital
of workers and raise GDP. Several researchers estimate the level of human
capital from education attainment and examine the impact of human capital
on GDP or economic growth [e.g., Mankiw, Romer and Weil, 1992]. On the
other hand, relatively little is known about the effect of the diversity of
human capital on GDP.
Apparently, the diversity of human capital differs across countries. Sev-
eral recent international surveys reveal this variation. Although different
surveys compare different abilities at different ages, some common tenden-
cies can be found in the surveys.1 Brown, Micklewright, Schnepf and Wald-
mann (2005) find that among 18 OECD countries, results from three surveys
(Trends in International Mathematics and Science Study, Programme for In-
ternational Student Assessment, and International Adult Literacy Survey)
consistently indicate that Finland and the Netherlands have relatively small
inequalities of achievements; the United Kingdom, New Zealand and the
USA have relatively large inequalities of achievements.2
How does this diversity of human capital influence GDP? The impor-
1Trends in International Mathematics and Science Study (TIMSS) covers achievement
in mathematics and science for early or middle teens, the Programme for International
Student Assessment (PISA) covers achievement in reading, mathematics and science for
early or middle teens, the International Adult Literacy Survey (IALS) examines ‘docu-
ment’, ‘prose’ and ‘quantitative’ literacy for all people of working age, and the Progress
in International Reading Literacy Study (PIRLS) examines the reading skills of young
children.
2Brown, Micklewright, Schnepf and Waldmann (2005) compare the difference between
the 95th percentile and 5th percentile of achievement distributions for 18 OECD countries,
converted from the data in TIMSS, PISA, and the late teens and early 20s in IALS. The
18 countries include Finland, Denmark, Netherlands, Canada, Czech Republic, Sweden,
Australia, Portugal, Norway, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Belgium, Hungary, Switzerland,
UK, New Zealand and USA. The countries are ordered from the most equal achievement
to the least equal achievement using the average ranking of the three surveys.
2
tance of this question can be understood when we recognize that one of
the central aims of an education policy is to provide students with equal
education resources. For example, several reforms have been conducted to
achieve equity in education outcomes in the United States. The 1971 land-
mark decision in Serrano v. Priest transformed the public education system
in California, and other states (e.g., Michigan in 1994 and Washington in
1979) have also centralized their education systems in order to achieve eq-
uity in education resources. More recently, the “No Child Left Behind Act”
by the George W. Bush administration aims to achieve equity in and a
high quality of education by raising the performance of the lowest achieving
students. Hence, the previous question leads us to ask a more important
question: can an egalitarian education policy raise GDP?
The answer is not obvious. On the one hand, if a government fails
to provide everybody with enough literacy skills, it would be difficult for
workers to communicate and cooperate with each other. On the other hand,
as top managers’ decisions are influential in a company, we want them to
understand the varieties of opinions and to make sound decisions. Hence,
some may insist that an education policy should target the bottom of ability
distribution; others may advocate the importance of education for the elite.
In order to evaluate the impact of an egalitarian education policy on
GDP, we need a model to link education reform, the diversity of human
capital and GDP in a unified framework. This paper aims to accomplish
this task. It constructs an overlapping generation model in which educa-
tion systems influence GDP by changing the variance in human capital and
compares alternative education systems by their effects on GDP.
This model is distinguished from the previous literature in two aspects.
First, we tractably parameterize the structure of industries and firms and
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examine how an education system and the production structure of an econ-
omy have an interactive effect on GDP. In particular, this paper pays special
attention to the span of control in a firm and the complementarity of goods
in an industry. A large span of control gives an individual the authority to
reallocate large amounts of resources. Without authority, an able person
cannot fully utilize his/her unusual talents. Hence, a high level of control
favors an education system that produces a few highly educated workers.
If complementarity of goods exists, the value of a firm’s product depends
on other firms’ product, and a good produced by incompetent persons may
reduce the value of other firms’ product. Hence, high complementarity of
goods demands an education system that produces many reasonably well-
trained workers.3
Secondly, different from the previous literature that analyzes education
policies in a dynamic general equilibrium model, education systems are
characterized not only by their financing systems, but also by their ability-
tracking programs. Hence, education systems change the way the hetero-
geneities of both income and ability influence the diversity of human capital.
A private education system yields more diverse human capital than a public
education system because the rich spend more on education than the poor.4
3For example, in a financial market, fund managers are allowed to allocate a large
amount of resources to buy different stocks that are highly substitutable. It is likely to
demand unusual talent. On the other hand, firms in the car industry need to combine a
number of complementary intermediate goods (e.g., the quality of tires is likely to influence
the value of brakes). This might demand many well-trained workers. The level of control
in the car industry would be influenced by the structure in the firm. If intermediate
good sectors are less vertically integrated, or bottom-up decision making is common, the
level of control would be low. Again, it must demand reasonably well-trained workers.
It is interesting to note that the structure of industries and firms in the U.S., which
is regarded as having relatively heterogeneous human capital, seems to relatively favor
unusual talent, while that in Japan, which is seen as having a relatively homogeneous
human capital, relatively favors reasonably well-trained workers.
4A private education system is defined as an education system in which individuals
finance the costs of education, and a public system is defined as an education system in
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On the other hand, ability tracking students into separate groups according
to their ability restricts those with whom they can interact as schoolmates or
classmates. Since advantaged students interact with advantaged students,
ability-tracking benefits advantaged students more than disadvantaged stu-
dents through the peer effects. Hence, a streamed program yields more di-
verse human capital than an untracked program by amplifying the benefits
from high innate ability.
This paper analyzes an aggregate economy in which an income distribu-
tion converges to a stationary distribution, and shows that a public system
yields higher GDP than a private system regardless of industry and firm
structure, while the effect of an ability-tracking program on GDP depends
on the production structure. As far as the variance of log income con-
verging to a finite value, this paper shows that, given a current GDP and
an ability distribution, a larger income difference reduces GDP at the next
period. Since the public system always lowers income inequality more than
the private system through the redistribution of income, it always attains a
higher GDP than the private system.
A similar mechanism is emphasized in the previous literature when the
human capital accumulation function is concave in expenditure on education
and the production function is linear in human capital (e.g., Loury, 1981,
and Glomm and Ravikumar, 1992). Our result shows that this still holds
even if the diversity of human capital increases GDP on the production side.
However, when the diversity of human capital is enhanced by ability
tracking, the structure of the production side becomes important. Differ-
ent from the dynamics of income distribution, the distribution of ability is
exogenously given and the variance of ability is always finite. It is shown
which revenues from labor income tax are assumed to finance the costs.
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that a rise in inequality in ability can increase GDP at the next period.
It is also shown that an ability-tracking program can attain higher GDP if
goods in an industry are fairly substitutable and if the span of control in a
firm is sufficiently large. Hence, the private education system may increase
GDP if a private school has more incentives or advantages to screen students
through its entrance examination.5 This result highlights a distinctive role
of ability tracking in macroeconomics.
This paper is based on the literature that compares the performance of
different education systems in a dynamic general equilibrium model (e.g.,
Glomm and Ravikumar, 1992, Bénabou, 1996 and Fernández and Rogerson,
1998). These papers compare different financing methods for education. In
particular, Bénabou (1996) examines the effect of diversity of human capi-
tal on economic growth when the human capitals of individual agents have
interactive effects on GDP. His main focus is to examine the role of comple-
mentarity of human capital at the community level and at the production
level. By contrast, we do not consider a local interaction at the community
level and pay more attention to the interaction at a production level. In
particular, we explicitly examine the role of complementarity of products
and a manager’s span of control to compare education systems. We also
explicitly analyze the effect of ability sorting on GDP.
Ability tracking has been examined by Epple, Newlon and Romano
(2002) and Brunello, Giannini and Ariga (2004). Although these papers
examine the benefits and costs of ability tracking, they do not examine the
role of the production structure. The interaction between an education sys-
tem and the structure of an industry and firm is the main focus of our
5A model in Epple and Romano (1998) predicts that a private school attracts more
able students than a public school.
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paper.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the
model, and Section 3 shows some results about the relationship between
income inequality and GDP. Section 4 compares the two education systems,
the public and the private. Section 5 considers the case with ability tracking
in public schools. Section 6 discusses some extensions and concludes. All
proofs are in the Appendix.
2 The Model
In this section, we construct an overlapping generation model with human
capital accumulation. The model features complementarities among inter-
mediate goods in the final good production and the span of control in the
production of intermediate goods. Individuals are required to participate in
both tax-financed (public) schools and self-financed (private) schools in their
life. In our benchmark model, private schools are allowed to sort students
based on their ability, while public schools are not. This assumption is re-
laxed later. Using this model, we derive the dynamics of individual income
and examine its aggregate behavior in the next section.
2.1 Technology
Consider an economy in which there is only one final (numeraire) good. The
final good is produced by combining intermediate goods {xi} where i is the
index for ith intermediate good. The production function of the final good
is given by:
Yt =
∙Z
(xit)
ρdi
¸1/ρ
, 0 < ρ < 1,
7
where xit is the amount of the intermediate good i at date t.
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The final good producers sell their products in a competitive market.
Taking the prices of the intermediate goods {pit} as given, a (representative)
final good producer chooses {xit} to maximize profits:
max
∙Z
(xit)
ρdi
¸1/ρ
−
Z
pitx
i
tdi.
The first order necessary conditions for profit maximization imply that the
demand function for ith good at date t is:
pit = Y
1−ρ
t (x
i
t)
ρ−1. (1)
Intermediate goods are produced by monopolistically competitive pro-
ducers. Specifically, the production function of the intermediate good i is
given by:
xit = h
i
t(k
i
t)
λ, 0 < λ < 1, (2)
where hit is the human capital of the producer i at date t and k
i
t is the
physical capital employed by the producer i at date t. This production
function captures the idea of the span of control a la Lucas (1978) in the
sense that the marginal product of capital declines as capital accumulates.
Hence, it is not productive for one manager to manage all capital. Note
that the larger is λ, the larger is the marginal product of capital. That is, a
larger λ allows the manager to productively operate more capital. Hence,
λ measures the degree of the span of control.
For a given (gross) interest rate rt and his/her own human capital hit,
the intermediate good producer i chooses {kit} to maximize his/her profits:
max pitx
i
t − rtkit,
6The elasticity of substitution of intermediate goods is given by 1/(1− ρ) > 1.
8
subject to the demand function (1) and the production function (2). From
the first order necessary conditions, we have the demand for physical capital
by the producer i:
kit =
∙
λρ
rt
Y 1−ρt (h
i
t)
ρ
¸ 1
1−λρ
,
and thus the profit function of the producer i is given by:
πit = (1− λρ)
µ
λρ
rt
¶ λρ
1−λρ
Y
1−ρ
1−λρ
t (h
i
t)
ρ
1−λρ . (3)
Note that for a given interest rate and total output, the producer i
produces the intermediate good i by the following amount:
xit =
∙
λρ
rt
Y 1−ρt
¸ λ
1−λρ
(hit)
1
1−λρ ,
and thus the total output of the economy at date t is given by:
Yt =
µ
λρ
rt
¶ λ
1−λ
H
1
1−λ
t , (4)
where Ht =
hR
(hit)
ρ
1−λρdi
i 1−λρ
ρ is the aggregate level of human capital.
Note that if the elasticity of substitution in intermediate goods in the fi-
nal good production and/or the degree of the span of control are so large that
ρ
1−λρ > 1 (i.e., ρ >
1
1+λ), Ht is increasing in the variance of human capital.
One of the immediate implications of this observation is that the hetero-
geneity in human capital across intermediate good producers is a source of
gains from society’s point of view if the intermediate goods are less comple-
mentary in the production of the final good, and/or the degree of the span
of control is large enough.
Let Πt denote the total profit of the intermediate producers, that is,
Πt ≡
R
πitdi. The relationship between total output and total profit is Πt =
(1 − λρ)Yt. Hence, the share of physical capital is 1− λρ, and the share of
intermediate good producers is λρ.
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2.2 Preferences and Human Capital Formation
There is a continuum of overlapping-generation families i of unit measure.
In each period, each family consists of one child, one young adult and one
aged person. Each individual lives for three periods. In the first period,
children obtain an education while they are still supported by their parents.
In the second period, young individuals work, spend part of their income for
current consumption and the education of their children, and save the rest.
In the third period, old individuals consume their savings.
Human capital is formed with individual ability ξit+1 (i.i.d. with mean
1), and public and private schooling. It is assumed that a child must spend
1 − θ fraction of his/her time at a public school and θ fraction of his/her
time at a private school. The production function of human capital is given
by:
hit+1 = (ξ
i
t+1)
φ
h
(Rit)
θ(Ut)
1−θ
iα
, φ > 0, 0 ≤ θ ≤ 1, 0 < α < 1,
where Ut and Rit are the quality of public and private education, respectively.
The quality of schooling consists of education expenditure and the average
ability (that is, a measure of the quality of a peer group) in each type of
school:
Ut = (ξ¯
Pub
t+1 )
νgt, R
i
t = (ξ¯
Pri,i
t+1 )
νeit, ν ≥ 0,
where ξ¯Pubt+1 is the average ability of students in public school, gt is the public
education expenditure per pupil, ξ¯Pri,it+1 is the average ability of students in
the private school the child of household i attends, and eit is the tuition cost
of this private school. A similar specification of human capital formation
can be found in, for example, Bénabou (1996), Epple and Romano (1998),
Nechyba (2000, 2003), Epple, Newlon and Romano (2002), and Brunello,
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Giannini and Ariga (2004).
The quality of a peer group in each type of school crucially depends
on the feasibility of sorting based on student ability. As a benchmark, we
consider the case in which private schools are allowed to choose students
based on their ability (and thus students are perfectly sorted in school by
ability), but public schools are not. This is a standard case studied by, for
example, Epple and Romano (1998), and we think that this is a plausible
case because private schools have more incentives and advantages to screen
students through their entrance exams than public schools. However, we will
discuss how our results change if public schools are allowed to sort students
based on ability in a later section.
The quality of a peer group in each type of school is determined as
follows. On the one hand, since students are randomly assigned to a public
school, the average ability in each public school is the same as the population
mean ( that is, ξ¯Pubt+1 = 1). On the other hand, since students are assumed to
be sorted in the private school by ability, the average ability of students in a
private school for students with ability ξit+1 is given by ξ¯
Pri,i
t+1 = ξ
i
t+1. Hence,
the reduced form of the production function of human capital is given by:
hit+1 = (ξ
i
t+1)
φ+αθν
³
(eit)
θ(gt)
1−θ
´α
. (5)
The utility maximization problem of the young individual in household
i is characterized as follows. The young individual of household i chooses
consumption when young cy,it , his/her child’s private education expenditure
eit and consumption when old c
o,i
t+1 to maximize his/her utility:
max ln cy,it + β lnh
i
t+1 + γ ln c
o,i
t+1,
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subject to the budget constraint:
cy,it + e
i
t + s
i
t = (1− τ t)πit, c
o,i
t+1 = rt+1s
i
t,
and the production function of human capital (5), where τ t ∈ [0, 1] is a tax
rate for public education and gt = τ t
R
πitdi is per capita public education
expenditure.
From this utility maximization problem, we have the optimal private
education and saving for the young individual i at date t:
eit =
αβθ
1 + γ + αβθ
(1− τ t)πit, sit =
γ
1 + γ + αβθ
(1− τ t)πit.
Hence, each household allocates constant fractions of his/her own disposable
income to each current and future consumption and the private education
of his/her child.
2.3 Physical Capital Market Clearing
The total supply of physical capital at date t + 1 (call it Kt+1) is given by
the total saving at date t:
Kt+1 ≡
Z
sitdi =
Z
γ(1− τ t)
1 + γ + αβθ
πitdi =
γ(1− τ t)
1 + γ + αβθ
Πt. (6)
On the other hand, the total demand for physical capital at date t + 1 is
given by:
Z
kit+1di =
Z ∙
λρ
rt+1
Y 1−ρt+1 (h
i
t+1)
ρ
¸ 1
1−λρ
di =
λρ
rt+1
Yt+1.
Hence, the market-clearing interest rate at date t+ 1 is given by:
rt+1 = λρ
Yt+1
Kt+1
= λρYt+1
1 + γ + αβθ
γ(1− τ t)
Π−1t . (7)
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2.4 Choice of Tax Rate
Each young individual votes for a tax rate that maximizes his/her lifetime
utility. We assume that when voters choose their favorite tax rate, they
take the future interest rate as given.7 Hence, they vote for a tax rate that
resolves the trade-off between the benefit from and the tax burden for public
education.
The indirect lifetime utility of the young individual in the family i is
given by:
v(τ t;πit, ξ
i
t+1,Πt, rt+1) = A(π
i
t, ξ
i
t+1,Πt, rt+1)+(1+αβθ+γ) ln(1−τ t)+(1−θ)αβ ln τ t,
where A(πit, ξ
i
t+1,Πt, rt+1) = (1+αβθ+γ) lnπ
i
t+βφ ln ξ
i
t+1+αβ(1−θ) lnΠt+
γ ln rt+1 + ln
h
(αβθ)αβθγγ/(1 + αβθ + γ)1+αβθ+γ
i
.
The favorite tax rate of the household with income yi is given by:
τ∗t =
αβ(1− θ)
1 + αβ + γ
. (8)
Note that the favorite tax rate is independent of household income (and any
other household characteristics). Although we assume that the tax rate is
chosen by majority voting, equation (8) implies that τ t = τ∗t is chosen by
unanimity no matter what the income distribution. That is, equation (8)
shows that the tax rate chosen in this paper is constant over time.8
7 In principle, the choice of tax rate affects the next period interest rate through the
aggregate human capital in the next period. Here we assume that voters ignore this effect
of tax choice.
8 If only the young individuals have the voting right, then τ∗t is chosen by unanimity.
Even if both the young and the old individuals are franchised, τ t = τ∗t is chosen by a
majority because τ∗t is always supported by at least half of the population (that is, all the
young individuals always support τ t = τ∗t ).
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3 Evolution of Income Distribution
In this section, we study the evolution of income distribution using the model
described in the previous section. In particular, we show that the hetero-
geneity in household income reduces the GDP of the next period, but the
effects of the heterogeneity in ability can be positive or negative depending
on the production structure. These results are crucial to understanding the
comparison of education systems in the next section.
3.1 Distribution Dynamics
To study the evolution of an income distribution, we track the dynamics of
the distribution of (pretax) profit income of young individuals (πit), because
this corresponds to the present value of lifetime (pretax) income in our model
(hereafter, we call it simply “income”).
For the given total output in period t + 1, the tax rate and the total
(profit) income in period t, and the income of the young individual i in
period t, the income of his/her child (and thus the income of the young
individual i in the next period) πit+1 is given by:
πit+1 = (ξ
i
t+1)
(φ+αθν)ρ
1−λρ (πit)
αθρ
1−λρY
1−ρ(1+λ)
1−λρ
t+1 Π
ρ[λ+α(1−θ)]
1−λρ
t B¯, (9)
where B¯ ≡ (1− λρ)
³
γλ(αβθθ(1−θ)1−θ)α
(1+γ+αβ)α+λ
´ ρ
1−λρ .
In order to characterize the dynamics of income distribution, we assume
that income and ability are distributed across individuals by the following
log-normal distributions: lnπit ∼ N(mt,∆2t ) and ln ξit+1 ∼ N(−σ2/2,σ2).
Under these assumptions, income of the next period is also distributed by
the log-normal distribution lnπit+1 ∼ N(mt+1,∆2t+1). The mean and the
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variance of log income in the next period are given by:
mt+1 = (α+ λ)mt +
h
1−ρ(1+λ)
ρ
(αθρ)2
(1−λρ)2 + λ+ α(1− θ)
i
∆2t
2
+(φ+ αθν)
h
1−ρ(1+λ)
ρ
ρ2(φ+αθν)
(1−λρ)2 − 1
i
σ2
2 + B˜,
(10)
∆2t+1 =
ρ2(φ+ αθν)2
(1− λρ)2 σ
2 +
(αθρ)2
(1− λρ)2∆
2
t , (11)
where B˜ ≡ (1− λρ)/ρ ln B¯ + [ρ(1 + λ)− 1]/ρ ln(1− λρ).
The evolution of income distribution is fully described by equations (10)
and (11). However, in tracking aggregate growth, we shall focus on GDP, Yt.
For this purpose, we would like to transform equation (10) to the dynamics
of lnYt. As lnYt = mt+∆2t /2− ln(1−λρ), we can rewrite the equation (10)
as follows:
lnYt+1 = R lnYt+αθ
∙
αθρ
1− λρ − 1
¸
∆2t
2
+(φ+αθν)
∙
(φ+ αθν)ρ
1− λρ − 1
¸
σ2
2
+B,
(12)
where B ≡ B˜+(R− 1) ln(1−λρ) and R ≡ α+λ. In the rest of this paper,
we mostly analyze the property of equation (11) and (12).
3.2 Transition
We first analyze the effect of diversity of human capital on GDP during
the transition process, and later discuss the same effect when the aggregate
economy reaches a steady state. Transition dynamics of GDP are char-
acterized by equation (12). Results from direct investigations on (12) are
summarized by Proposition 1.
Proposition 1: For given Yt,
1. Yt+1 is strictly increasing in σ2 if and only if ρ > 1/(φ+ αθν + λ).
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2. Yt+1 is strictly decreasing in ∆2t if and only if
αθρ
1−λρ < 1.
The first part of Proposition 1 says that heterogeneity in ability may
have positive effects on the next period’s GDP. The variance of ability can
affect the next period’s GDP through the following two channels. The first
channel is ability tracking. If ability tracking has substantial peer group
effects, the overall variance of ability in the economy affects the average level
of the next period’s human capital. In particular, if the elasticity of peer
group effects in the private school ν is so high that the total elasticity of
human capital to ability (φ + αθν) is larger than unity, the human capital
accumulation function is convex in ability and therefore the next period’s
average human capital is increasing in the variance of ability.
The second channel is the span of control. Remember that a large span
of control gives an individual the authority to reallocate a large amount of
resources, and thus a large span of control favors workers with very high
ability. If the degree of the span of control is large (and complementarity
among produced goods is relatively small), the diversity of ability increases
GDP. This effect is reflected in equation (4). It shows that if ρ1−λρ > 1, a
large variance in human capital increases GDP.
Consequently, if the “total” elasticity of income to ability ((φ+αθν)ρ/(1−
λρ)) is larger than unity, the variance of ability has positive effects of the
next period’s GDP.9
The second part of Proposition 1 shows that the effect of inequality in
current income on GDP at the next period depends on the parameters αθρ1−λρ .
The mechanical reason can be understood by equation (9). Note that the
9Note that the variance in ability raises the next period’s GDP even if GDP is decreas-
ing in the variance of human capital when ρ ∈ (1/(φ+ αθν + λ), 1/(1 + λ)). In this case,
the first (positive) effect dominates the second (negative) effect.
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left-hand side of the equation (9) is strictly concave in πit if and only if
αθρ/(1 − λρ) < 1. Hence, the high variance of πit reduces the expected
value of πit+1, and, therefore, GDP, if and only if αθρ/(1− λρ) < 1.
On the other hand, equation (11) shows that the variance of log income
converges to a finite value if and only if αθρ/(1 − λρ) < 1. Hence, the
following corollary is the immediate result.
Corollary 1: Suppose that the variance of log income does not diverge.
An increase in current income inequality lowers GDP at the next period.
This negative effect of the variance of income on GDP is interpreted as
the result of the concavity of the production function of human capital with
respect to household income, as in the previous literature. For example,
Loury (1981) and Fernandez and Rogerson (1998) derive the same results
when the production function of human capital is concave in current income
and the production function of consumption goods is linear in human capital.
In their setting, the mapping from current income to next-period income
is concave and, therefore, their income dynamics converge to a stationary
process.
Different from the previous literature, our production function in the
consumption goods sector can be strictly convex in human capital if the
span of control in a firm is large enough. It provides a possibility that the
income in the next period can be a strictly convex function of current in-
come. Nonetheless, Corollary 1 implies that the concavity of the production
function for human capital must outweigh the convexity of the production
function for consumption goods when the variance of log income converges
to a finite value.
An intuitive reason can be understood as follows. Whenever an increase
17
in inequality in current income always raises the average income at the
next period, the mapping from current income to next income must exhibit
convexity. However, the convexity of the mapping implies that the current
rich are likely to receive disproportionately high income at the next period.
This means that inequality at the next period is larger than that in the
current period. Hence, the variance of log income is infinite in the long run.
In other words, insofar as we restrict our attention to the income dynamics
that have a finite variance in the long run, the mapping from the current
income to the future income must exhibit concavity for some income level.10
3.3 Steady State
Next, we examine the relationship between the steady-state variance in in-
come and steady-state GDP. For this purpose, we must know when two
aggregate state variables, lnYt and ∆2t , converge to steady states. Equa-
tion (11) shows that the variance of log income converges to a stationary
point if and only if αθρ1−λρ < 1. Provided that the variance of log income
converges to a stationary point, equation (12) shows that the logarithm of
GDP converges to a stationary point if and only if R < 1. Note that R < 1
guarantees αθρ1−λρ < 1. This reasoning proves the following lemma.
Lemma 1: An aggregate economy converges to a stationary distribution
if and only if R < 1.
Since we would like to analyze the relationships among income inequality,
10Technically, we obtain Corollary 1 because local concavity (around a steady state)
implies global concavity in equation (9). This is a standard assumption in this literature
and we can still apply Corollary 1 when a deviation from the assumption is small. However,
if a mapping from current income to future income exhibits a more general form, we
may need additional assumptions on the variance of ability to guarantee the negative
relationship between current inequality and future GDP.
18
the heterogeneity in innate ability, and GDP in the long run, we assume
R < 1 in the rest of this paper.11 As the variance of log income has a finite
value on the stationary distribution, an increase in inequality in current
income lowers GDP at the next period during the transition process. We
want to show how the result changes in the long run.
Using equations (11) and (12), the logarithm of GDP in the steady state
is given by:
lnY∞ =
1
1−R
∙
1
2ρ2(φ+ αθν)
D(ρ;α,λ, θ, ν,φ)∆2∞ + ln B˜
¸
,
where:
D(ρ;α,λ, θ, ν,φ) = ρ2(αθ(αθ−φ−αθν)−λ(φ+αθν+λ))+ρ(φ+αθν+2λ)−1,
(13)
and
∆2∞ =
ρ2(φ+ αθν)2
(1− λρ)2 − (αθρ)2σ
2.
If D > 0, then the greater is the variance of income, the higher the long-run
GDP (and vice versa). The effects of income inequality on steady-state GDP
is summarized as Proposition 2.
Proposition 2: (1) If λ < 1−φ+(1−ν)αθ, the higher is the steady-state
variance of income, the lower is the steady-state GDP. (2) If λ > 1 − φ +
(1−ν)αθ, the higher is the steady-state variance of income, the higher is the
steady-state GDP if and only if ρ ∈ (ρ, 1) where ρ = 1/(φ+αθ(ν−1)+λ).
This proposition tells us that when the production of the final good
is sufficiently substitutable and the degree of the span of control is large
11Even if we allow endogenous growth (that is, R = 1), the results regarding transition
dynamics in the rest of the paper remain unchanged. Almost all results from the steady-
state analysis also can be applied to the analysis of the long run growth if we relabel
steady-state GDP to “the long-run growth rate”.
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enough, the relationship between income inequality and GDP is positive in
the steady state. Note that, similar to the case of transition, the variance
of income affects the next period’s GDP negatively. However, since the
steady-state variance of income is determined by the variance of ability,
which can have a positive impact on GDP, the total association between
income variance (and hence the variance of ability) and GDP in the steady
state depends on the combination of these two effects. When the final good
production is sufficiently substitutable and the degree of the span of control
is large enough, the positive effect of the high variance in ability dominates
the negative effect of the variance of income.
In summary, the (causal) effect of income inequality on GDP is negative
in our stationary economy, but heterogeneity in ability can have positive
effects on GDP due to ability tracking and the span of control. Moreover,
the long-run association between income inequality and GDP can be positive
or negative depending on the production structure of the economy.
4 Public vs Private Education System
In the benchmark model, we allow both public and private education invest-
ment in human capital accumulation (when θ ∈ [0, 1]). However, comparison
between public and private education systems may be of interest because
such comparison is useful to identify the advantages and disadvantages of
each education system. In the literature of education macroeconomics, many
researchers study the costs and benefits of each education system through
such comparison (e.g., Glomm and Ravikumar 1992, Bénabou 1996, Fer-
nandez and Rogerson 1998, and so on). In this section, we also study the
comparison between the public and the private education systems in the
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short run and in the long run.
4.1 Short Run
Imagine that the economy with the distribution of household income lnπit ∼
N(mt,∆2t ) is about to choose between the private (θ = 1) or the public
(θ = 0) education system. Starting from this income distribution, the next
period’s GDP is given by the equation (12). The difference of the next
period’s GDP under the two systems is given by:
lnY Pubt+1 − lnY Prit+1 = −α
µ
αρ
1− λρ − 1
¶
∆2t
2
−αν
∙
ρ(2φ+ αν)
1− λρ − 1
¸
σ2
2
, (14)
where Y Pubt+1 and Y
Pri
t+1 are the next period’s GDP under the public (with
θ = 0) and the private system (with θ = 1), respectively.
Under the assumption that the aggregate economy converges to a steady
state in the long run, the first term of this equation is always positive. This
is because income inequality reduces average human capital in the next
period in the private system, but this effect is absent in the public system
as expenditure on education does not depend on households’ income in the
public system.
The total comparison between the public and the private systems cru-
cially depends on the sign of the second term and the relative size of the
variance in household income and ability. This comparison is summarized
as Proposition 3.
Proposition 3: (1) If ρ ≤ 1/(2φ+αν+λ), the public system generates
higher GDP in the next period than the private system. (2) If ρ > 1/(2φ+
αν + λ), the private system generates higher GDP in the next period than
the public system if and only if ∆2t <
ν[ρ(2φ+αν+λ)−1]
1−ρ(α+λ) σ
2.
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Observe that the second term of the equation (14) is positive if ρ <
1/(2φ + αν + λ). In this case, the public system is always better than the
private system. Intuitively, if the production of the final good is complemen-
tary enough in terms of human capital, public education is better because
it generates low variance of human capital.
However, the second term of the equation (14) is negative if ρ > 1/(2φ+
αν+λ). In this case, the private system has an advantage because the vari-
ance of human capital is a source of gains. As the private system generates
a higher variation in human capital than the public system, it generates a
higher output.
The total comparison of these two systems crucially depends on the
variance of household income when the production of the final good has
less complementarity. If the variance of household income is small enough
relative to the variance of ability, the private system is better than the public
system because the positive effect in the second term dominates the negative
effect in the first term.
4.2 Long Run
Next, we compare steady-state GDP under the two systems. In the short
run, in the comparison of education systems the initial variance of household
income is taken as given and common to the two systems. However, in
the long run, the degree of income inequality depends on which education
system the economy adopts. Hence, we need to compare steady-state GDP
and income inequality under these two systems.
The difference in the steady-state GDP under the two systems is given
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by:
lnY Pub∞ −lnY Pri∞ =
1
1−R
"
−α
µ
αρ
1− λρ − 1
¶
∆2,Pri∞
2
− αν
µ
ρ(2φ+ αν)
1− λρ − 1
¶
σ2
2
#
,
(15)
where ∆2,Pri∞ = {ρ2(φ+αν)2σ2}/{(1−λρ)2− (αρ)2}. Similar to the case of
transition, the first term is positive, and the sign of the second depends on
the production structure of the economy. We state the results of the long-
run comparison between the public and the private system in Proposition
4.
Proposition 4: (1) When ρ ≤ 1/(2φ + αν + λ), the public system
generates a higher steady-state GDP than the private system. (2) When
ρ > 1/(2φ + αν + λ), the public system generates a higher steady-state
GDP than the private system if and only if ∆2,Pri∞ >
ν[ρ(2φ+αν+λ)−1]
1−ρ(α+λ) σ
2.
Moreover, for each (ρ,α,λ,φ) satisfying the assumptions R < 1 and ρ >
1/(2φ + αν + λ), there exists a unique ν∗(ρ,α,λ,φ) such that the private
system generates higher steady-state GDP than the public system if and only
if ν > ν∗(ρ,α,λ,φ).
The first part of this proposition states that the public system generates
higher GDP when the production of the final good is complementary enough
even in the steady state.
More interesting, the second part of this proposition tells us that when
the final good production is less of a complement the long-run comparison
of GDP under the two systems depends on the long-run variance under the
private system. In this case, the private system generates higher steady-
state GDP than the public if the elasticity of human capital production to
the quality of a peer group is large enough. Intuitively, when the elasticity of
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human capital production to the quality of a peer group is large, the produc-
tion function of human capital becomes more convex in individual ability,
and thereby sorting by ability in private schools contributes to generating a
large amount of human capital.
5 Ability Tracking in Public Schools
So far, we assume that the ability sorting occurs only in private schools.
Recently, however, ability tracking in public schools is one of the main issues
in the debate on education reforms (e.g., Lefgren 2004). In this section, we
first examine how our results on the system comparison change if we allow
for public schools choosing students based on their ability. Next, we compare
the public system with ability tracking to that without tracking in order to
evaluate the effect of ability tracking on GDP.
5.1 Public vs Private System
When the public school is allowed to select students based on ability, the
average ability of students in a public school for students with ability ξit+1
is given by ξ¯Pub,it+1 = ξ
i
t+1. The reduced form of the production function of
human capital is given by: hit+1 = (ξ
i
t+1)
φ+αν
³
(eit)
θ(gt)
1−θ
´α
. In this case,
the equations (14) and (15) become:
lnY Pubt+1 − lnY Prit+1 = −α
µ
αρ
1− λρ − 1
¶
∆2t
2
> 0,
lnY Pub∞ − lnY Pri∞ =
1
1−R
"
−α
µ
αρ
1− λρ − 1
¶
∆2,Pri∞
2
#
> 0,
where ∆2,Pri∞ = {ρ2(φ+αν)2σ2}/{(1−λρ)2− (αρ)2}. Therefore, the public
system generates higher GDP than the private system both in transition
and in the steady state. In this case, the only difference between the public
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and the private system is their source of finance. As a reduction in the
current variance of income increases GDP at the next period, the public
system generates a higher GDP than does the private.12
5.2 Tracking vs Mixing in Public Schools
Can ability tracking in public schools increase GDP? To answer this ques-
tion, we compare GDP under the public system with ability tracking to that
under the public system without tracking.
The difference of the logarithm of GDP under these two education sys-
tems during transition is given by:
lnY Pub,St+1 − lnY
Pub,M
t+1 = αν
µ
ρ(2φ+ αν)
1− λρ − 1
¶
σ2
2
,
lnY Pub,S∞ − lnY Pub,M∞ =
1
1−R
"
αν
µ
ρ(2φ+ αν)
1− λρ − 1
¶
σ2
2
#
,
where Y Pub,St and Y
Pub,M
t are GDP under the public system with and with-
out ability tracking, respectively. From these equations, we have the fol-
lowing result:
Proposition 5: Ability tracking in public schools generates higher GDP
in both transition and steady state if and only if ρ > 1/(2φ+ αν + λ).
From Proposition 5, we may conclude that ability tracking in public
schools increases GDP when the production of the final good is a sufficiently
substitutable (large ρ), the degree of the span of control (λ) is large enough,
the production function of human capital is less concave (large α), and/or
the elasticity of human capital to the peer group effect (ν) is large enough.
12 In the case where neither public nor private schools are allowed to select students
based on ability, the public system generates higher GDP than the private system both
in transition and in the steady state.
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In summary, when public schools are allowed to select students based on
their ability, the public system generates a higher GDP than the private both
in transition and in the steady state. However, whether the ability tracking
in public schools increases GDP crucially depends on the interaction between
the production structure of the final and the intermediate goods and the
technology of human capital accumulation.
6 Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we examined how different education systems change GDP
through their influence on the diversity of human capital. We analyze an
economy in which an income distribution converges to a stationary distribu-
tion. We show that the diversity of human capital due to income inequality
always lowers GDP, while diverse human capital induced by heterogeneous
ability can increase GDP if produced goods are sufficiently substitutable and
firms have a large span of control. Hence, we may conclude that a public
education system always yields higher GDP than a private education sys-
tem, though the effect of ability tracking on GDP depends on the structure
of industries and firms.
It is worth mentioning some cautions to the interpretation of our results.
We focus on the effect of different education systems on GDP. But obviously,
GDP is not the only variable that governments should be concerned. In our
model, both a private system and ability tracking increase the variance of log
income and lower social mobility. Hence, our model indicates that equalizing
school resources can also promote efficiency, but that ability tracking may
induce a serious trade-off between efficiency and equity in some societies.
One of messages from this paper is that if a government wants to know
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how serious the trade-off is, it must carefully investigate the structure of
industries and firms.
Although we examine the effect of ability tracking on GDP in this paper,
we can extend our analysis to other policies that can change a mapping from
ability to human capital. More specifically, we can extend our analysis to
policies that influence the human capital accumulation function through
the following path, hit+1 = (ξ
i
t+1)
φ(θ,p)
³
(eit)
θ(gt)
1−θ
´α
, where p is a policy
parameter. For example, when policy allows individuals more flexibility in
choosing how many credits they can take in a year, it is likely that talented
students take more courses than ordinary students do.13 In this case, more
able students accumulate a larger human capital not only because they are
talented, but also because they study harder. Hence, the effect of ability
on human capital is more than proportional and φ (θ, p) becomes larger by
this policy. According to our analysis, the impact of this policy on GDP
depends on the structure of production. In this way, our analysis suggests
that we cannot evaluate the economic consequences of a liberal education
policy without the knowledge of how industries and firms are organized.
As indicated by this example, there will be more unexplored issues about
the relationship between education policy and the structure of the produc-
tion sector. We hope that this paper helps researchers in unraveling part of
the complicated relationships.
13The Japanese government substantially reduced the number of subjects that students
must study in elementary school, junior high school and high school during 1990s. Accord-
ing to Kariya (2001), as a result of this policy change, students who previously received
poorer grades reallocate their time more to leisure than those who previously received a
better grade.
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A Proofs
A.1 Proposition 1
Proof. Obvious from the equation (12). Q.E.D.
A.2 Proposition 2
Proof. We first show (2) of the proposition. The second part of the propo-
sition is true if D > 0 when ρ ∈ (ρ, 1) and D < 0 when ρ ∈ (0, ρ). Solving
equation D(ρ;α,λ, θ, ν,φ) = 0 for ρ, we have ρ = 1/(φ+αθ(ν− 1)+λ), ρ¯ =
1/(λ+αθ). Since αθ(αθ−φ−αθν)−λ(φ+αθν+λ) < 0, φ+αθν+2λ > 0
and D(0;α,λ, θ, ν,φ) = −1 < 0, D > 0 if and only if ρ < ρ < ρ¯. Under
the assumption λ > 1 − φ + (1 − ν)αθ, ρ < 1 < ρ¯. Therefore, D > 0 when
ρ ∈ (ρ, 1) and D < 0 when ρ ∈ (0, ρ).
Next we show (1) in the proposition. For the first part, note that ρ > 1
if λ < 1 − φ + (1 − ν)αθ. This implies that D(ρ;α,λ, θ, ν,φ) < 0 for any
ρ ∈ (0, 1). Therefore, the association between GDP and income variance in
the steady state is negative when λ < 1− φ+ (1− ν)αθ. Q.E.D.
A.3 Proposition 3
Proof. (1) When ρ ≤ 1/(2φ+ αν + λ), lnY Pubt+1 − lnY Prit+1 > 0.
(2) When ρ > 1/(2φ + αν + λ), lnY Pubt+1 − lnY Prit+1 < 0 if and only if
∆2t <
ν[ρ(2φ+αν+λ)−1]
1−ρ(α+λ) σ
2. Q.E.D.
A.4 Proposition 4
Proof. For the first part, observe that
³
ρ(2+αν)
1−λρ − 1
´
< 0 when ρ ≤ 1/(2 +
αν + λ). Hence lnY Pub∞ − lnY Pri∞ > 0.
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For the first half of the second part, note that lnY Pub∞ − lnY Pri∞ > 0 if
and only if ∆2,Pri∞ >
ν[ρ(2+αν+λ)−1]
1−ρ(α+λ) σ
2.
Finally, we prove the last half of the second part. The long-run variance
of household income under the private system is given by:
∆2,Pri∞ =
ρ2(1 + αν)2
(1− λρ)2 − (αρ)2σ
2.
Hence, lnY Pub∞ − lnY Pri∞ > 0 if and only if:
ρ2(1 + αν)2
(1− λρ)2 − (αρ)2σ
2 >
ν[ρ(2 + αν + λ)− 1]
1− ρ(α+ λ) σ
2,
and this inequality is equivalent to:
αρ(1− λρ)ν2 + [(1− λρ)(ρ(2 + λ)− 1) + αρ(ρλ− α)]ν − ρ2 < 0.
When ν = 0, the left-hand side (LHS) is negative and thus lnY Pub∞ −
lnY Pri∞ > 0. When ν →∞, LHS is infinity and thus lnY Pub∞ − lnY Pri∞ < 0.
Since αρ(1 − λρ) > 0 and LHS is negative when ν = 0, there exists
a unique ν∗(ρ,α,λ) > 0 such that LHS = 0 when ν = ν∗(ρ,α,λ) and
lnY Pub∞ < lnY
Pri
∞ if and only if ν > ν
∗(ρ,α,λ). Q.E.D.
A.5 Proposition 5
Proof.
³
ρ(2φ+αν)
1−λρ − 1
´
> 0 (and thus Y Pub,S∞ > Y
Pub,M
∞ ) if and only if
ρ > 1/(2φ+ αν + λ). Q.E.D.
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